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Phillip Iohnson, in a number of recent writings, most notably in his 
1991 book, Darwin on Trial. has called into question the whole of evolu-
tionary science by arguing that it is based on the philosophical system of nat-
uralism which assumes without justification that God plays no part in the 
process by which living things come to be.' The philosopher, Robert 
Pennock, in his recent book, 7bwer of Babel: The Evidence against the New 
Creationism, defends science against Johnson's charge, arguing first that 
naturalism is not atheistic and so does not deny God, and second, that the 
principle naturalism uses to keep God out of science is adopted for good 
methodological reasons.2 I want to enter into this discussion between 
Johnson and Pennock about the relation between (naturalistic) evolutionary 
theory and theism. I will ask: Does evolutionary naturalism. rule out the the-
istic God? If so, how? Is the ruling out a metaphysical claim (that God does 
not exist) or merely a methodological rule that disallows supernatural expla-
nations? Is the ruling out logical or probabilistic? Other points of disagree-
ment between Johnson and Pennock I will consider, although less fully. are 
framed by questions such as the following; Can the two explanatory 
I Phillip E. Johnson, Darwin on 1Hal (Washington, IX: R.egnery Gateway, 1991); 2nd ed. 
(Downel'5 Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993) The second edition includes in its epilogue a 
response to the reviewers and critics of the first edmon. RefemH.:es to this WOJk (abbreviated 
Dl) arc Included In text and arc 10 the second edition. 
2 Robert T. Pennock, 7bwer of Babel: The evidence against the New Creationism 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999). Refereoc:es 10 this work are abbreviated in text as TB. 
The work incorporates the essentials of an earlier cntique of Iohnson: wNanuaiism, Evidence 
and Creationism: The CIISC of Phillip Johnson.," Biology and Philosophy 1 t (1996): 543-59; 
Johnson responds in "Response to Pennock," Biology and Philosophy 11 (1996): 561-3. 
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"hypotheses" (God and e\'olutionary principles) be made compatible (for 
elUlmple, in the way that "If:i.~ti(: (!\·u/utiolliM.<; havc tried to combine them)? 
Is Johnson right that there is a fundamental opposition between them? Can 
the theistic hypothesis be brought into science and be part of a scientific 
explanation of life-forms (as Johnson thinks). or docs religion belong whol-
ly to another sphere of life outside of science (as Pennock thinks)? Lastly. 
how should theologians think of the theistic God and its activity in relation 
to the natural order that science describes? 
Docs evolutionary theory rule out the theistic God? Johnson's answer is 
a resounding Yes. To understand this, we need, first, to see what Johnson 
means by the theistic God. Although he docs not adhcre to a strict definition. 
we can tell contextually that he is referring to a being (a) who creates the 
natural order; (b) guides it according to a plan or purpose; (c) enters into 
meaningful rdalion!>hips with his creatures; and {possibly} (d) intervenes in 
nature's processes in order to effect his purposes. 
To sec why Johnson thinks that evolutionary science conflicts with this 
God. we have to look at his philosophical argument against naturalism. 
Pennock has brought out nicely that Johnson attacks science on two fronts, 
the philosophical and the empirical, and while Pennock responds to both 
arguments, hc thinks the philosophical charge is innovative and "does the 
real work" (TD, 188). In this discussion, I am going to focus mainly on 
Johnson's philosophical arguments against naturalism. 
The philosophical charge begins with the idea that science as a whole 
rests on the philosophical system of naturalism. The basic "assumption" of 
this naturalistic system is that natural causes are ruled in, and the supernatur-
al God is ruled out. That is, it is just assumed, a priori (as Johnson often puts 
it), that God is not causally active in the natural process and so is excluded 
from consideration as a possible explanation of natural events. And the spe-
cial science of evolutionary biology, based on this same naturalistic system, 
similarly rules out God as a possible explanation of biological phenomena. 
Further, naturalism adopts a particular mC!taphysical system that holds 
that matter and energy arc "all there is." On this interpretation, which we 
might call strong lIalur{lIi.~m. God is ruled out not only as an explanatory 
entity, but as an existing entity. 
According to naturalism, what is ultimately real is nature, which con-
sists of the fundamental particles thaI make up what we call matter 
and energy, together with the natural laws that govern how those par-
ticles behave. Nature itself is ultimately all there is, at least as far as 
we arc concerned. To put it another way, nature is a permanently 
closed system of material callses and effccts that can never be influ-
enced by anything outside of itself-by God, for example. ' 
1 I'lnllip E. jolm.~on. R,·t1.wm ill /1Ii! IJII1ml<'<'; 7111! Cu.w oWJill.l/ NUII/To/mn III Science, Luw, 
u"d EtI"cullol/ (Downcrs Grove. IL: IlltcrVarsily Press. 1995).37·8. 
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In this passage we can see Johnson trying to hold together two very dif-
ferent views of what naturalism implies about God. The strong naturalistic 
claim is atheistic and flatly denies that any supernatural being exists. But a 
more moderate naturalistic claim is suggested that God may exist outside of 
nature, but whether he does or not makes no difference to humans since, as 
far as our knowledge is concerned, he does not (or cannot) intervene in the 
natural realm. It is clear that Johnson often describes naturalism in a way 
that runs together these two incompatible versions of it. This may be because 
he tends to equate evolutionary naturalism with the views of some atheistic 
critics of creationism, such as Richard Dawkins. Be that as it may, Johnson 
does in some places admit that "naturalism does not explicitly deny the mere 
existence of God" (DT, 116.17), and so in this discussion we will take him 
to be arguing against the moderate fonn of naturalism which allows that a 
God may exist in some form. However even the moderate fonn seems to 
have no place for the theistic God which is conceived as taking an active pilTt 
in nature and in human affairs. 
What is most important about naturalism then, for Johnson, is the prin-
ciple or premise that allows only certain kinds of materialistic causal expla-
nations and disallows all supernatural ones.4 Moreover, Johnson thinks that 
this exclusionary principle is itself a metaphysical or philosophical assertion 
without any basis in fact. It is an a priori assumption-not in the philosoph-
ical sense of being grounded in reason alone, but in the popular sense of 
being arbitary or reflecting an individual's (or a group's) subjective prefer-
ences or prejudices. It is a "doctrine" or "dogma" or "ideology" and thus 
ultimately not open to rational debate. Furthermore, Johnson believes that if 
evolutionary theorists would only disabuse themselves of this exclusivist 
principle and open themselves to the possibility that God is the cause of 
complex biological phenomena, they would then be able to see that the 
observable evidence runs against them, and rather points in the direction of 
an intelligent cause. 
Johnson thinks that the metaphysical assumptions of naturalism extend 
even further into evolutionary theory and include the basic principles of 
mutation and natural selection. The claim that these principles arc meta-
physical and nonempirical is meant to bolster his empirical argument that 
they are not supported by observational evidence. 
Natural selection exists, to be sure, but no one has evidence that it can 
accomplish anything remotely resembling the creative acts thal 
Darwinists attribute to it. ... As an explanation for modifications in 
• It is not important for Johnson what malenal things sciencc posits as ontologlcally rcal-
for examplc, whether they include particles, forces or fields. Nor does he develop the Implica-
tions for theism of lite fact that only matcrial or physicalisllc things are positcd. All that mal-
ters to him is that these things do not include supcrnatural beings. 
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populations, Darwinism is an empirical doctrine. As an explanation 
for how complex orgaDisms came into eXistence in the first place, it 
is pure philosophy. (DT, 117) 
The philosophically imponant part of the Darwinian theory-its 
mechanism for creating complex things that did not exist before-is 
therefore not really part of empirical science at all, but rather a deduc-
tion from nalurali!otic philosophy. (DT, 158) 
Unfortunately, Johnson does not go on to specify how the "mechanism 
for creating complex things that did not exist before"-the mechanism of 
chance variation and natural selection is a "deduction from naturalistic phi-
losophy." Darwin's chosen mechanism certainly could not be deduced from 
the assumption that life fonns have a naturalistic and not a supernaturalistic 
explanation. But in other places, Johnson fonnulates the point differently: 
The conflict betwecn Darwinism and theism arises because the [evo-
lutionary hypothc!lis] is a product of naturalistic philosophy, not obser-
vation or-experiment. ... [W]c have no good reason to suppose that 
Darwinian selection was thc mechanism of creation unless we make 
the naturalistic assumption that nature had to do its own creating.' 
The idea is that since God was ruled out, then evolutionary theorists had to 
operate on the assumption that na/llre had to do its own creating, and so they 
devised the principles of mutation and natural selection. The point seems 
most plausible if construed as a claim about what motivated the originator(s) 
of the theory. Possibly Johnson is arguing that Darwin himself cast aside the 
intelligent-designer hypothesis that was prevalent in the theologicatIy-based 
science of his time, and then searched for a different one to take its place. 
On this view, Darwin's entire project stems from his initial assumption that 
God's intentions and special acts should IIot be allowed as explanations of 
natural life. We can imagine Darwin approaching his data with this danger-
ous idea in mind: how is it possible to cxplain the development of species 
without bringing God's special acts into our account? He then generates his 
novel explanatory idca. 
Historically, Darwin's project docs secm to tit this dcscription; Darwin 
did make a conscious and deliberate effort 10 find fully naturalistic explana-
tions of life-fonns, and consistently rcpudiated any attempt to bring God 
into the picture to supplement his theory. I Ie viewed appeals to God as 
obstructing science and standing in the way of finding natural causes. 
Further, these naturalistic explanations were supposed to explain everything 
pertaining-to the development of species that God's acts ofspecial creation 
I Phillip E. Johnson, HRcsponsc 10 113~kcr." Chm/wn Sd",lar~ Review 22 (1993): 298. 
This article is a responloC to Wilham Ila,kcr's paper "Mr. Johnson for thc Prosecution," 
ChrlSliall Scholar ~ Rn'iew 21 (1992); 177-86. 
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purported to explain, making the latter explanation of these phenomena 
otiose. Writing to Lyell shortly after the publication of the Origin, he states. 
"I would give nothing for the theory of Natural Selection, if it requires 
miraculous additions at anyone stage of descent." And to Lyell again, two 
years later: "The view that each variation has been providentially arranged 
seems to me to make Natural Selection entirely superfluous, and indeed 
takes the whole case of the appearance of new species out of the range of 
science."6 And so on this interpretation, Darwin meant his theory to exclude 
God in so far as he conceived and offered it as an alternative naturalistic 
hypothesis that was supposed to displace the God-hypothesis.7 
But if we thus interpret Darwin's commitment to naturalism as the rul-
ing out of the theistic hypothesis, (and perhaps of all supernatural hypothe-
ses), thereby delimiting the range of alternative hypotheses. it remains 
unclear why Johnson thinks of Darwin's selected hypotheses (chance varia-
tion cum natural selection) as deductions from his initial ruling out The only 
thing that follows from Darwin's initial abandonment of theism is that he is 
bound to find some nontheistic alternative explanation-one that will be 
incompatible with theism in some respect. Darwin's initial ruling out is 
indeed the starting point of his search for an alternative. but it is odd to think 
of it as a premise or even as an assumption from which the alternative theo-
ry is derived.' Darwin sought to replace one hypothesis with another which 
he thought made better sense of the evidence at hand, including the exten-
sive observational evidence that he collected. His theory cannot be dis-
missed on the philosophical grounds that it is derived from a prior commit-
ment to finding an alternative to an hypothesis that he deemed incorrect. It 
must be judged, like any other theory in science, on the basis of its overall 
explanatory adequacy. 
• Quoted by Neal Gilbpie. Charh'f Darwin ami the Problem of Creation (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Pre&\, 1979), 120. GillespIe comments on thIS theme: "It is sometimes 
saId that Darwin eonverll.-d the SCIentific world to evolution by showing them the process by 
which it has occurred. Yet the unca~y reservations about natural selection among Darwin's con-
temporaries and the widc:;.prcnd rejeclion or It from the 1890's to the 1930's suggest that thIS is 
too simple B view of the malter. It was more Darwin's insistence on totally natural explanations 
than on natural selection that won thcir adherence" (146). 
I Of course subsequent CvolulionaJY scientislS may be differently rnoUvatoo than Darwin 
was. It may nol even occur to them to con~ciou&ly and deliberately resist supernatural causes in 
part because Darwin's theory has succeeded in replaell1g Ihe old paradigm, and also because the 
naturalistic principle has become so entrenched in science that it is just taken for granted. 
• "Darwimsts know that the mutation-selection mechanism can produce wings, eyes, and 
brains not because the mechanism can be observed to do anything of the kind, but because their 
guiding philosophy assures them that no other power is available to do tbe job. The absence 
from the cosmos of any Creator is therefore the essentialstartmg-poillt for Darwinism" (DT, 
117, emphasis added). 
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To take this o!lj"~lilln a lolep funh"'r, we mighl compare Darwin's rejec-
lion oflheistic ex.rl;lnallun .. tu t:il"tdn's al1anduning urthe ether as partial-
ly explanatory of Ihe rnollllO IIf phy,ic:tI budll:s in !>pace. In his special the-
ory of relati\·ity, Einlotdn excluded Ihe c:llu:r (and any similar substance) 
from Ihe physical principles and wncepls he used (0 explain the movement 
of light panicles and boJies in 'pace .lnd lime. It would be absurd for a crit-
ic of Einstein's theory to c;,11 intl) qu.:,tion ,ha' ,heory on the grounds that it 
had ruled OUI the ether hypothe,is frum Ihe start, and thaI we only have rea-
son· to Ihink thaI tho'ic principles are (empirically) true because we have 
m3de the: inilial a'iSUmptlUll that there: i .. no other explanatory construct 
available 10 do the job: 
But we arc stilllell wilh Johnloon's claim Ihal Ihe naluralistic principle 
that exclUdes God ilnd :111 supematurdl powers is itself pure philosophy. If 
that assumplion is a priori and ilrbitr;lry, then nhy should scientists continue 
to maintain it? Why. he a:.ks. is iI simply laken for granted that life·forms 
have only naturalistic callses. and not supernaturalistic ones? What is the 
justification of that exclusion'! For the moment, let us leave open this chal-
lenge about the stat liS :md jUlotificatilln of the naturalistic principle that rules 
out God. noting only the peculiarity of a principle that says that certain kinds 
of explanations are "or allowable. In a liller section. we will sec that Pennock 
concedes that science docs make such an assumption, but, he will argue, 
supernatural beings are kept out of science for sound methodological rea· 
sons, and so the assumption is not arbitrary. 
At this point in the discllssion, we may well ask why life·forms cannot 
have both the naturalistic causes that science ascribes to them and a super-
natural cause. TllCiJ/ic emllll;otli.I·I ... accept the process of evolution as sci· 
cnce describes it. but argue that a creator-God is needed as the being who 
explains the whole evolutionary process. God institutes evolutionary laws 
and in some way also guides the process toward the end that he envisions. 
The suggestion would seem to be one that Johnson would favor since 
he also speaks orthe theistic God as guiding the process in order to further 
his purposes. But in fact. Johnson adamantly opposes this compatibilist 
view on the grounds that there is an "inherent conflict between Darwinism 
and theism:"llowcvcr. since he also maintains that "God can work through 
natural processes that arc accessible to scientific investigation including 
mutation and natural selection:' we may wonder why there is a fundamen-
tal conflict between the two theories. II Part of the answer is that Johnson 
believes that naturalism will not allow that God is active in the process. But 
that by itself docs not mean that God could not usc Darwin's evolutionary 
, Thanks to the ammymlllllo n:f.::n:e whll'ol: commcnt' ~harrcncd Johnson's philosophical 
argumenl and 10 which the lahl two pnragl'llph~ nrc II "-'Ply. 
,. Jol\l\o.on, "Respl1nM: \l' Ila:-l..cr." 297. 
" Ibid., 29M. 
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mechanism to create. Another reason Johnson gives cuts deeper, namely that 
it is impossible to split off the (metaphysical) rejection of God from the rest 
of evolutionary theory. 
Metaphysics and science are inseparably entangled in [evolutionary 
theory]. I think that most theistic evolutionists accept as scientific the 
claim that natural selection perfunned the creating, but would like to 
reject the accompanying metaphysical doctrine that the scientific 
understanding of evolution excludes design and purpose. The prob-
lem with this way of dividing things is that the metaphysical state-
ment is no mere embellishment but the essential foundation for the 
scientific claim. (DT, 168) 
Here the strong claim is advanced that the metaphysics (exclusion of God) 
and the science are "inseparably entangled" so that we cannot simply disso-
ciate the theory from its antitheistic premise and then invoke God as a cause 
at a higher level. A conflict between the theory and the God-hypothesis will 
inevitably arise. But what is it about Darwin's theory that conflicts with the 
God of theism? Johnson must identify the points of tension or conflict ifhe 
is to argue successfully against theistic evolutionism. 
What Johnson typically says in this sort of context is that Darwinists 
claim that evolution is "a purposeless and undirected process that produced 
mankind accidentally" or that we owe our existence to "a blind materialistic 
process"-as if it were obvious that such a process could not be consistent 
with God's purposeS.12 We want to know why an intelligent God could not 
make use of random processes and material forces to create the varieties of 
life on earth. 
In the essay from which the above phrases were taken. Johnson devel-
ops further the idea behind the conflict he sees by bringi!1g to bear some 
additional theologically-based arguments aimed at showing that "attempts to 
accommodate theism and Darwinism are inherently futile. "I] In one of these 
arguments he explains why a process that includes chance variations and 
accidental results conflicts with the Christian theistic God, and why it is very 
unlikely that God used such a method: 
Darwinistic evolution would be a most peculiar creative method for 
God to choose, given the Darwinistic insistence that biological evolu-
tion was undirected. That requirement means that God neither pro-
grammed evolution in advance nor stepped in from time to time to 
pull it in the right direction. How then did God ensure that humans 
would comc into existence so that salvation history would have a 
chance to oceur?'4 
" Philhp E. Johnson, ''Crealor or Bhnd Watchmaker?" Firs' Things, January 1993, 8-9. 
"Ibid., 14. 
"Ibid., 12. 
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1 believe that this ide:. that. if c\'olution;II'Y theory is true, humans might not 
have come into existence can he d..:\ clupcd in a way that brings out a seri-
ous conflict between e\'olution and theism. 
In a recent discussion (If Darwin, the social historian Louis Menand 
emphasizes the central role that chance plays in Darwin's theory. He writes, 
"[wJhat was radical about 011111(' Origill ofS(I(·("i(·.f was not its evolutionism. 
but ... something evcn his most lo)'al disciples were reluctant to admit, 
which is that the specics-including hum.m beings-were created by, and 
evolve according to, proceslocs Ihat are entircly natural, chance-generated. 
and blind."!! In order to establi~h this, D.u\\'in had to develop wbat amount-
ed to a whole new way of thinking. To begin, part of Darwin's novel strate· 
gy was that he focused on the ,lifj,·t"!.·I/(·C.f between particular organisms 
rather than the similarities that enabled them 10 be grouped into fixed kinds 
or types. For example, he noticed \'ariations in the length or thickness of a 
bird's beak: These individlml dincrcnees were selected by nature if they 
gave the organism an adaptive advantage over its competitors in the strug-
gle for survival. 
The process of natural selection is Mind in two ways. First, the varia-
tions that are selected are oncs the individual just happens to have. Darwin 
saw variations always occurring in naturc's regenerative processes, and took 
. them to be an unexplained given in hi~ system. lie claimed that these varia-
tions were produccd by dlCmC'e in the sense that thcy were unpredictable, not 
that they were uncaused or indcterminate. 
Secondly. nalural selection is a blind process "because the conditions to 
which the individual organism must adapi in ordcr to survive are never the 
same."" The conditions that the individual happens to meet are the ones that 
happen to be there, and Ihese too are unpredictable. And out of this fortu-
itous coming together of individual difference and external circumstance, an 
evolutionary change may occur. Menand illustrates the process as follows: 
Darwin thought ... that variations occur by chance, and that chance 
determines their adaptive utility. In all ~ea,«ms it happens that some 
finches arc born with marginally longer and narrower beaks than oth-
ers, just as children of the same parents aTe not all exactly the same 
height. In e~ain environmental condltiono;, a narrower beak may have 
positive or negative survival value, but in lither conditions-for exam-
ple, when seeds are plentiful and finches arc few-it may make no dif-
ference. The ''selection'' of ["vorable characteristics is therefore nei-
ther designed n01 pmgrClosivc. No intelligence, divine or otherwise. 
determines in advance the relative vllluc of individual variatIOns .•.. 
"Louis Menllnd, 77, .. 1II"'''I,Jr.l'.''("(/{ ('11111 (NI.'W York: Farrar. Straus and Giroull, 2001). I'll. 
"Ibid., 122. 
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Natural selection is a law that explains why changes occur in nature, 
[and] how changes occur in nature. But natural selection does not dic-
tate what those changes shall be. It is a process without mind .... 
Evolution is simply the incidental by-product of material struggle, not 
its goal. Organisms don't struggle because they must evolve; they 
evolve because they must struggle. 17 
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In such a chance-driven process, there is no guarantee that any particular 
species (including humans) will evolve. 
In his 1989 book. Wondetful Life, Stephen Jay Gould developed an 
interpretation of Darwin similar to Menand's that emphasizes what he calls 
the ''massive historical contingency" of evolution and leads to a similar con-
clusion.·1 Based on his study of the anatomical features of the fifteen to 
twenty different organisms in the Burgess Shale. Gould concludes that a sci-
entific observer could not have predicted which of them would be survivors 
and which losers in the subsequent mass extinctions. The ones that survived 
were the ones favored by Lady Luck. Here is how he describes the contin-
gency of the overall process: 
The divine tape player holds a million scenarios, each perfectly sen-
sible. Little quirks at the outset, occurring for no particular reason 
unleash cascades of consequences that make a particular future seem 
inevitable in retrospect. But the slighest early nudge contacts a differ-
ent groove, and history veers into another plausible channel, diverg-
ing continually from its original pathway. The end results are so dif-
ferent, the initial perturbation so apparently trivlal. I ' 
And regarding the ascendancy of mammals he writes: 
If mammals had arisen late and helped to drive dinosaurs to their 
doom, then we could legitimately propose a scenario of expected 
progress. But dinosaurs remained dominant and probably became 
extinct only as a quirky result of the most unpredictable of aU 
events-a mass dying triggcred by extraterrestrial impact. If 
dmosaurs had not died in this event, they would probably still domi-
nate the domain of large-bodied vertebrates, as they had for so long 
with such conspicuous success, and mammals would still be small 
creatures in the interstices of their world. This situation prevailed for 
a hundred million years: why not for sixty million more? Since 
dinosaurs were not moving toward markedly larger brains, and since 
such a prospect may lie outside the capabilities of reptilian design, we 
"Ibid., 122-3. 
II Stephen Jay Gould, WOIrJ(·rful L,((': 17,(, Burges., Shale and the Nahlrr! a/History (New 
York: W. W. Norton. 1989), 233. 
10 Ibid., 320-1. 
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musl assume that consciousness woulLi nol have evolved on our plan-
et ira cosmic cata~trophe haLl not claimed the dinosaurs as victims. In 
an entirely literal sen~e, we owe tlUr cxi~lence, as large and reasoning 
mammals, to our lucky lotars.'" 
Returning to Johnson's theological argument, since God had in mind a 
plan for humans, namely that he would take the form of a human, Jesus, 
who would die on the cross to redeem them from their sins, then he would 
. not have created a natural process that left it genuinely open whether 
humans would evolve. At least it would seem an imperfect plan to will that 
the divine nature take on human form if the very existence of any humans 
depended on small unpredictable quirks and nudges in the evolutionary 
process he initiated. 
But perhaps it was left genuinely open whether humans would evolve, 
but God. who is all-knowing, created a world in which he foresaw that 
humans would in fact evolve by chance. The emergence of humans would 
be unpredictable on the ba!>is of natural factors, and only predictable if we 
could know the creator's mind. But there is a theological problem with this 
compatibilist solution. It seems to make God a deceiver. If God created a 
world that gives every indication to a rational observer of being one in which 
chance reigns, when in fact the process is moving toward a preconceived 
goal, would not Ihis be at Ihe very Icast misleading to our inquiring minds? 
So Johnson is right that there is a serious tension here; it is unlikely that the 
theistic God, who is not a deceiver, would have created a process that left 
open "a million scenarios, each perfectly sensible," or even a few scenarios, 
unless each and every one of them led to the appearance of intelligent human 
beings on earth. 
It is important to sec that Johnson docs not think of the conflict between 
evolution and theism in terms of /ogim/ incompatibility. Evolutionary prin-
ciples are not strictly incompatible with Christian theism. God could have 
used Darwin's mechanism of chance variations and natural selection to cre-
ate, but Johnson thinks it is unlikely that he did (for both theological and 
empirical reasons). Thus the opposition between evolution and theism is put 
in terms of its being impl'Obah/e that both arc true. The logical relation is that 
if evolution is true, then certain claims about, for example, the Christian God 
are likely to be false and would have to be revised or abandoned; and if the-
ism is true, then some basic principles of evolution arc probably false and 
will have to be revised or abandoned. 
,. Ibid., 31 R. Gould view~ the fate of 1/""'(1 ,1CI1'/('nf II~ cqUIIlly precanous: "[Wle are an 
improbable and fragile en Illy, fonunalcly ~ucce~,ful after prcc'lriou~ begmmngs as a small pop-
ulation m Africa, nol the predictllble end resuh ofa globallcndcncy .... Run the tape again, and 
let the tiny twig of l/ollllJ .frlph·,/,f expire m Africa. Olher homimds may have stood on the 
thre~hold of what we know 11& human p,,,,ibllilic~. but many scn~ible scenarios would never 
generate our level of menlillity" (lIl-JIIJ<,t;fill Li/I!, 319-20) 
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This brings us to what I call Johnson's solution to the conflict between 
science and religion. It involves two additional aims. First. the theistic God 
(intelligent designer) should be brought into science. and considered along. 
side of evolutionary theory as a legitimate alternative. Johnson anticipates 
that if this is done, then the God-hypothesis will prove to be the better sci-
entific theory; that is, it will be found to be more in accord with the observ-
able evidence (such as the fossil record) than evolutionary theory. and thus 
be more acceptable than its rival by science's own standards. And second, 
Johnson's larger aim is to illtegrate science and religion by way of a unified 
scientific theory that has a place for a designer-God who superintends the 
natural realm and the human beings that inhabit it. For this reason, he resists 
any attempt to exclude God from influencing nature by assigning God's 
actions and interventions to another "spiritual" realm separate from the nat-
ural realm. 
Let us look more closely at Johnson's claim that God should be brought 
into science. How exactly is this supposed to work? Pennock takes up this 
question in his section "The Prospects for a Supernatural 'Theistic Science'" 
(TD. 294) where he argues that the prospects are not good. It is a mistake, 
Pennock thinks, to try to "naturalize" God, to make God part of the sort of 
explanatory account that science constructs, to make God a scientific con-
struct. To do so is to "do a disservice to both religion and science" (TB, 206). 
Pennock sets up a dilemma for any proposal for a theistic science: "If 
one takes God to be supernatural, then God and the Creation hypothesis 
have no place in science. On the other hand, if one naturalizes god to make 
the Creation hypothcsis scicntific, then we find ourselves faced with a God 
who is not very godly" (TO, 308). Let us consider first the second hom of 
the dilemma. 
As Pennock sees it, Johnson's approach does a disservice to religion 
because it makes God into a finite object. which conflicts with the tradition-
al theistic idea of God as transcendent and holy. But I do not see that 
Johnson is in any danger of compromising God's transcendence and making 
God into a natural object. Johnson's main contention is that the God-hypoth-
esis explains obscrvable facts; it is no more integrally connected with empir-
ical data than that. And even if the God-hypothesis is supposed to be on a 
scientific par with other naturalistic hypotheses qua explanatory construct, it 
is different from them preciscly because it invokes a supernatural cause. 
However Pennock is forcing the question of how the God-hypothesis is 
supposed to function in science, Johnson might reply that it functions as a 
guiding principle much as it did for Newton and Paley. God as intelligent 
creator sets up boundary conditions in nature. God creates an orderly world 
in which all or most things have some reason for being as they are. Scientists 
who investigate the world can expect to find those reasons. To be sure, 
Johnson is willing to put God to the test in the head-la-head competition that 
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he em'isions, and some believers may think that this act alone is irreverent 
But Johnson would defend against this religiously-based objection by citing 
scripture: If God's creative act is "clearly perceh'ed in the things that have 
been made" (R(lman~ I :20). then there should be plcnty of observable evi-
dence in nature to support this belief. and there can be nothing unholy about 
using it to establish the designer hypothesis. 
If Johnson will not be gored on the second horn of Pennock's dilemma. 
ifhe retains God as a supernatural being, transcendent and outside of nature, 
what about the first horn: if one takes God to be supernatural, then God and 
the Creation hypothesis have no place in science? Pennock has a two-
pronged argument 10 back up his claim that God and the creationist hypoth-
esis have no place in !'>cience, The first is that God's actions and interven-
tions into the natural realm arc not I(',flah/e in a broad sense of that term (to 
be explained). And sccond, the acts or etTects of supernatural beings and 
powers arc by delinition cOIllrOl), to loU'. and as such fall outside the bound-
arics of scientific explanation. Let us examine each of these arguments. 
First, Pennock qucstions whether any of three central claims Johnson 
makes about the Christian theistic God t1re testable-thnt God performs spe-
cific (I('/S in nature, that God directly ('alllro/,r nature, and that God's acts fur-
ther his purpos('S, Regarding the second claim that God directly controls 
nature, Pennock asks: how docs God intervene to controt the process ofthe 
origin of species? what is the causal process that God acts on or through? 
For example, docs God create (as some theologians have maintained) by 
causing the variations upOn which selection occurs'! or by selecting the vari-
ations that will survi\'e'! How would we know that God had acted in that 
way? "May theistic science appeal to ex "iIIi/o miracles or other miraculous 
control processes'!': (TB, 298), 
Regarding the other two claims, Pennock maintains that there is no 
clear-cut empirical procedure or test for identifying some observed phe-
nomenon as the result of God's act or intention. But science requires that all 
theoretical constructs must be tied more or less directly to observable veri-
fying procedures, In contrast to the Creation hypothesis. "[tJhe Darwinian 
view holds that the evolutionary processes arc working all the time, and can 
point to observations thereof. We can observe mutation. recombination, 
inheritance, natural selection, and the resultant changes in gene frequencies 
in popUlations" (TB, 297). In putting his challenge in this way, Pennock is 
not espousing naive verification ism. He realizes that the absence of clear-cut 
tcsts that would verify (or falsify) are not sufficient grounds for ruling out a 
hypothesis. But he is bringing out the fact that any theoretical principle must 
have a closer connection to empiricat observable fact than Johnson and 
Intelligent Design theorists seem to realize. It must be tied to a large num-
ber of spccific observable or experimental contexts (sets of data) and explain 
those specific data as well as, or better than, rival hypotheses and theories, 
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When Pennock states that "we can observe mutation. recombination. inher-
itance. natural selection, and the resultant changes in gene frequencies in 
populations." he is pointing to the close connection between these theoreti-
cal constructs in evolutionary theory and spccific sets of correlated data. The 
general principles of evolution get tied to these data indirl'Ctly by way of 
organizing and explaining these intermediate constructs. When Pennock 
asks how we would identify. rccognilc, know about. any of God's particular 
actions or purposes, he is pointing out that the God-hypothesis gives us 
nothing like the evolutionary explanatory system that links gencral princi-
ples to specific sets of data via intermediate lower-Ie\'el constructs. Thus the 
theistic hypothesis falls far short of its ri\'al in rc!.pcct of one crucial test of 
empirical adequacy in science. namely, Ihe "'IIIlh£'r unci "ariel), 0/ killds 0/ 
data that it can accoullt/or.:! 
This argument based on the empirical adequacy of design hypotheses 
has, I believe considerable force again!.t thei!llic science, but it still leaves 
the door to science open a crack for theism; for theistic hypotheses might 
still be admissible in science if they Can be made tC!llable in the broad sense 
I have described. Pennock tries to close ofT this pos!oibility with another line 
of argument aimed at keeping the thcilotie God out of science altogether. Put 
simply. the argument is that any explanation Ihat appeals to a .'fll"ertratllrai 
being is contrary to the very essence of ~cicncc "hich ;s to explain narural 
phenomena in terms of lawful regularities. 
The importance of lawfulness in gh"ing Iocicnti fie explanations is 
revealed in this passage: 
Empiriealtcsting relics fundamentally 1I(llln the lawful regularities of 
nature whieh science has been able to Lh .. clwer and !>ol11etimes codify 
in natural laws. For exam(lle. tebco(lie (lh"eT\"ations implicitly 
depcnd upon the laws go\eming optical phenomena. If we could not 
rely upon thesc laws-if. for example. c,"cn '" hcn under the samc 
conditions, telescopes occa~;onally mag11lficd (lroperly and at other 
occasions produced \"arious dl\lortlOn'l dependent liay. 11pon the 
whims of some !>upematural Cnllty-wc could not trust telescopIc 
observations as cvidencc .... But wilho\lllhe Clm\traint of lawful reg-
ularity. inductive evidential infercnce cal1not gct ofT the ground. (T8, 
194-5) 
" If it is argued 1hat1he intelligent de"gn h) ('C'IIII:'" ma\r.c, [(lhen-Ill Ihe ,\\.11 (If 1,,\\ ·lc\.:1 
construct~ and hypolheses Ihal Pennock mcnUIIII, (.llUllhcn- arc I11dny (1lhl.'''' he .. hll:\ n,,1 men· 
tion) as well as evolutionary principles. f \\,.uld 11.'1'1) lh.\I flll!.'!!!!;!!:nl fk"!gn Ihcllrl,l\ l11u,1 
undertake Ihis ta~k orunillng all or mllSt oflhcc,c llllTerenl LlIld, "f.1.113 un.ler IhclT h}J"Il'lhcM' 
before it can be considered by science II~ II n\o.l h),I'Olh':'I'" 
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The author goes tm 10 !>:ly that thill is thc r.llionale for scientists making "the 
melhodoh)gical as·mrnpllun th.lt loupcmaturJI enllties do not intervene to 
negate la\\ tul n;llurJl rcgul.uitk~" (7"11, lIJS). 
It is notc\\onhy Ihal Ihere i .. a !toOlc\\hal technical meaning of super-
IICllllrtll at play in Ihi .. dl"l:ulo.,inn. In a uloeful seclion on "Supernatural 
Explanalums," loupemalurill agenls and rowers arc chal'ilcteriZC<i as being 
(I) "above :md bc)'und the nalur.ll w,Irld"; (2) "inherenlly mysterious to us" 
because "(ah n:llur.11 bdng'i, ,Iur knu"lcdgc all comcs \'ia natural laws and 
processes": and (3) "nllt cuntrollahle by humans" (TR. 289-90). Each of 
these propertic .. seel11'; c:llcul:lted to take supcrn:uural beings out of the 
sphere of lociencc :lI1d uliT natural kl1(l\\ Icdge. The acts or effects of super-
natural being" un the 'M'Tld arc \·jcwcd by I'ennock as having no natural 
causes and hence a. . (cuntr.lcau!>;!I) \'iuIOltiuns of nature's laws. 
In this way, I'cnnuck atlelllpls 10 delivcr a knockout {lunch, designed to 
show that divine causes can bc excluded frmn science as belonging to a class 
of causes thaI !lcicncc cannol deal with. But Pennock's argument fails, I 
belicve, because it depends un his definitions of the concepts of scientific 
exp!cmatiOIl and of Ih" .1l1/"'l'twt,,,.t11 which, in Ihc end, amount to a stipula-
tion that there is a boundary around the natural world that science investi-
gates. and that God and other supernatural beings cannot cross it. 
But the definitions arc tm) rel>lrictivc. In the first place, on the side of 
scientific explanation and ul1der~landing, Pennock overcstimates the role of 
law and lawful regularities in giving naturalistic explanations. Scientists do 
not always explain events by subsuming them under laws. And in evolu-
tionary biology it is hardly ever the ca~e that e\'ents arc explained by find-
ing laws that cover them. As we have seen. D:lrwin cxplained evolutionary 
changes <in part) by appealing to chance \'ariations as a basic principle that 
was contrary to law. Ch'lIlee variations were indeed couched in a wider con-
text of lawful regularities. but Goo's interventions could be so as well. 
Further. Gould has cmphasiled the contingency and nonrepeatability of 
some evolutionary changes, implying that evolutionary laws cannot account 
for the success ofsol11c organisms and the failure of others. He advocates the 
model of hi.~/o,.icCiI explanations in biology thaI "take the fonn of narrative." 
A historical explanation is ba!>ed nn the rrinciple of contingency and "does 
not rest on direct deductions from laws of nature, but on an unpredictable 
sequence of antecedent states, \\ here any major change in any step of the 
sequence would have altered the final result.":: Although Gould is holding 
onto the idea of causality in historical explanations, perhaps even causality of 
the dctenninistie kind, it is clear that these explanations do not refer to any 
lawful regularities or rcpeatable events.ll It may be that divine explanations 
" GOlIlll, IJ;}III/l'I:fi11 l.ifi·. 2113. 
" Philip Kitchel' PIII~ (orw;m.llhc bimilar Idea Ihal evululiollilry theorisls Iypically construct 
"Darwinian hi.\tol'lcs" II~ a I'l'lJhlcm-~III\lmg 'Irmegy 10 c,,-plain evollliionary changes. See 
Ahll.~illg Sd"ne," Till! ell It" u~ai".~, Ot'III;"II/I/II (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 1982),50-2. 
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would not fit into Gould's model of explanations in biology any better than 
they fit into Pennock's, (we would still have the problem of how we could 
know that one of the contingencies that led to an event was God's interven-
ing act); but if they did not, it would not be because they involved violations 
of nature's laws. 
And on the side of the supernatural cause, it is not clear that God's 
interventions would necessarily "violate" or "negate" natural laws, as 
Pennock strongly suggests. God could intervene in nature at the level of 
human affairs and decisions, inducing changes in human minds which could 
then have a downward causal effect on underlying coordinate physical 
events. Or God might intervene at the physical level, somehow influencing 
probabilistic events for example, thus effecting changes in human experi-
ence from the bottom up. Although the how of these interventions would 
have to be specified more precisely, my point is that it is an open question 
whether they would involve violations of nature's laws (especially if those 
laws are not detenninistic). Compare how it is with human agents. There is 
an ongoing debate about how to fit human agents and their actions into a 
material world. Are human (mental) volitions reducible to physical states of 
the brain? Or are they not reducible to, but "supervenient" on, those states? 
If the latter, are they capable of influencing the physical states that sub serve 
them? And if they can influence those underlying physical states, how can 
they do so without violating the laws that govern them? 
I am not trying to resolve these latter issues, but simply pointing to the 
fact that they are open questions in the philosophy of mind and body. 
Cognitive scientists may not be very receptive to the idea that something that 
may be conceived as outside our neurological systems-a conscious mental 
state-might affect something inside that system, but some at least have 
tried to fonnulate a model of how this might occur. And to my knowledge, 
cognitive scientists have not invoked a methodological naturalist principle 
that wholly rules out any such speculation. But if philosophers of mind can 
speculate about how human minds might influence their bodies and the 
world without overturning science, theologians might also think about how 
God might influence the world, perhaps in similar ways, without transgress-
ing the rules of science. 
There is a deeper problem here about dividing supernatural powers and 
forces from natural ones by drawing a sharp boundary between them, and 
then restricting our knowledge, as natural beings, to the natural realm. The 
problem is that there is no natural boundary between the natural sphere 
(accessible to our rational minds) and the supernatural sphere (inherently 
mysterious to us). We have to make such a boundary, and I do not see any 
way of doing so without arbitrarily deciding which sorts of possible causes 
we want to keep out of science and beyond the limits of our natural knowl-
edge. We will say that these causes are inherently mysterious, or that there 
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is no way for us to detect them, or that there is no agreed-upon method for 
verifying them. But there is no way for nacuralists to eliminate any class of 
causes from possible consideration by science. All that methodological nat-
uralists can do at any point in the history of science is draw a line around 
those hypotheses that science has been able to test in some way and distin-
guish them from those that science cannot yet do anything with. 
Explanations in terms of divine causes are ruled out now only because we 
cannot find a way to connect them with scientific explanation and its theo-
ries and empirical data in its present state. But this could change. 
Another way of putting this point is that the boundaries of natural sci-
ence arc fluid; for example, they arc currently being shaped and adjusted to 
account forthe properties of human minds as these arc being investigated by 
the cognitive and social sciences. As regards the divine mind, although I 
think it unlikely that Intelligent Design hypotheses will gain entrance into 
the scientific worldview, I do not sec any way of ruling this out as an impos-
sibility except by stipulation. Further, while it is true that appeal to the prin-
ciple of methodological naturalism has proved effective since the time of 
Darwin and embodies \cssons that have been learned over more than a cen-
tury in the competitive marketplace of scientific ideas and theories, the prin-
ciple should not be absolutized, and would have to be suspended if 
Intelligent Design theorists could make their hypotheses meet standards of 
empirical adequacy. 
What should we conclude about Johnson's solution to the contlict 
between science and theism? If we accept the criticism that Intelligent 
Design hypotheses lack empirical import, then we will doubt the prospects 
for the kind of integrated scientific theory Johnson envisions. Intelligent 
Design theorists have not made their case that there is any place in science 
for a theistic hypothesis. Out if we keep God apart from the natural world as 
disclosed by science. what then remains of Johnson's positive view, and in 
particular his claim that we should seek an integrated theory? 
r wish to propose that instead of seeking to integrate the two explanato-
ry theories by uniting them in a single theory, theologians should seek to rec-
oncile these accounts by making them consonant. There are several impor-
tant insights that we can take from Johnson in our effort to forge a reconcil-
ing view. First, we can retain his resistance to the deistic option of reducing 
God's role to creation by an initial act, followed by noninterference of any 
kind in the natural process. In other words, defenders of theism should not 
forget they are defending a personal, activist God. 
Second, we can retain his resistance to the view that separates (the 
supernatural) God from nature and Ihen assigns God's actions and interven~ 
tions to a spiritual realm which is not only separate from the natural realm, 
but completely "walled ofT"~· from it. Science is then awarded exclusive 
" Johnson uses this apt tenn in "Creator or Blind Watchmaker?" 11. 
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authority over the natural realm. \\ In II: the spiritual realm falls under the 
jurisdiction ofthe theologian or pric!ot. A second and more subtle part of this 
proposal is that the natural realm is idcntilied with thl: It,tli and the ratiollal, 
while the spiritual realm is judged to be unreal (or not fully real) and irra-
tional (or not fully rational). 
Pennock favors this \'iew thOlt religion bcl(lOgs to another realm. He 
suggests as a viable option "that God is concerned with our spiritual rather 
than our material being and thus intcf\'clles only at a spiritual level" (TB. 
192). We also sec it in his endorsement of the idea of God as "mysterious 
and inscrutable" (TD, 307) and the claim that "[a}5 natural beings, our 
knowledge all comes "ia natural laws and processes" (T8, 290). lie goes on 
to say in this passage: "The lawful regularities of our experience do not 
apply to the supernatural world. If therl: are other sorts of supernatural 
'laws' that govern that world, they can be nothing like those that we under-
stand." 
In another passage. he allows that when farmers' crops fail. it may be 
true "that their crop failure is simply part of God's curse upon the land 
because of Adam's disobedience or ... that the Lord is punishing them for 
some moral offense and that it might not be fertilizer they need. but contri-
tion and repentence." But "such spiritual possibilities fall under the purview. 
oftbe priest and not the scientist" (TD. 282-3). lie goes on to say that "the 
proper role of the scientist is to scarch for natural causes of such occur-
rences" implying that even if God is causally contributing in some way to 
the poor crop. there are still (sufficient) natural causes for the event and they 
will not be affectcd by whatevcr God may do. So whatever reality this shad-
owy spiritual realm may have. preloumably it is not one that we can know 
anything about, or if we do have some kind of understanding of it. it is not 
any understanding that might challenge or even conflict with scientific 
knowledge. 
Johnson resists this compartmentalization of science and religion. and 
there are some very good rc:lsons why a theist should. First, the view ignores 
the question of how the two realms arc related. It overlooks the fact that the 
God who acts in the spiritual realm is also the creator of the natural realm. 
And so the question has to be asked: how are these two realms part of one 
creation? When, for example. God intervenes and alters persons and mental 
events in the spiritual plane. would not corresponding states of those per-
sons' brains and bodies also be altercd so that they would be in states that 
they would not have been in if Glld had not acted? If there is one created 
order, then there must be a (,(}IIgnl£'llc'e between the spiritual and the natur-
al spheres. This is where Johnson's vision of an integrated theory is relevant, 
now in a different sense, but also relevant is the fundamental opposition 
between science and religion that he has indicated. If theism is true, as 
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Johnson believes, there must be a way of hamloniling the theistic God with 
the best science of ollr day. And theologians !ohould be trying to find ways of 
making God's purposes nnd pru\'idenli:11 goodness congruent with what sci-
ence is telling us about who we are, and the kind of physical process that 
brought us to when: we arc-at lhe IUP of Ihe heap, without glossing over 
the inconsonances.:· 
What about the second part of Ihe two-realms view that assigns a sec-
ond-class status to Ihe religious realm as far as its claim to be real and ratio-
nal. Johnson of course rc!oilots this. I Ie and other intelligent design creation-
ists may be viewed as rcfu'iing to cede tn science Ihe entire realm of the nat-
ural and Ihe rational undcT!otanding of it. As the conllict between theism and 
evolutionary theory grows, the critic!! of religion sec science as gradually 
shouldering God out of the picture, not simply by metaphysical or method-
ological fiat, but on thi: (·,'ic/e·milll ground that God is becoming more and 
more implausible as an expl;mation of anything that occurs in the biological 
realm. Johnson resists the inference that the theistic view is the more 
improbable one, and that the onu .. falls on thei!lom to make compromises and 
concessions to science. Convinced of the truth of theism. he concludes that 
there must be something wrong \\ ith the evolutionary side of the argument. 
-that evolutionary theory has gouen ''(In the wmng track and needs to be 
brought back to reality."" lie bclicn~s as theists must believe that science 
wilt eventually change its course.' 
What recommendation can W(' make to both parties in this debate. A rec-
onciling view that docs not presume that either side is on the wrong track, 
and that also recognizes Ihe opposition between them, will anticipate 
changcs coming from both sides. We urge theologians to take a critical atti-
tude toward science, identifying the points al which theological claims clash 
with scientific claims and then plolting the direction Ihat science must go in 
to accommodate essential theological belief. ... They mu~t pick their battles: 
Mind is not reducible 10 matter'? There is direction or progress in evolution? 
What look like chance-based. unguided evolutionary changes are not? But 
at the same time. they must be willing 10 cnntemplale fundamental changes 
in their own theological systems. such as qualifying God's attributes of 
omnipotence or omniscience. And !>cience, for its part, should be receptive 
to this critical function of theology, recognizing 1hat novel hypotheses that 
challenge old paradigms can come from any quarter. 
" I am alluding here nnt ollly til the c,"lIm~cncy elf Ihe: prncC"'o' "c",n(,cd Dhc.l\e:. but also 10 
the: siruggle for e:)lj,tcIlCC a11l11hc: unlnld dc,lruClilln lind \\a,le: Ihal allc:nd~ it. 
I- 10hno,on, ··Crealor or nhnd W .. lo:hmal..c(r· 1.$. 
